In Why we cooperate (2009), Tomasello addresses the problem of human uniqueness, which has become the focus for a lot of recent research at the frontier between the Humanities and the Life Sciences. Being both a developmental psychologist and a primatologist, Tomasello is especially well suited to tackle the subject, and the present book is the most recent one in a series of books and papers by himself and his colleagues (see below). Tomasello's basic position is squarely a dual-inheritance account, in which human uniqueness is explained both through genetics and through culture (in other words, both through natural and through cultural evolution). The main idea is that the phylogenetic specificity of humankind rests in its species-specific adaptation for sociability. The account offered by Tomasello contrasts human cooperation and altruism with nonhuman primate competition, and proposes that human altruism leads to shared intentionality (the ability to share attention to a third object and, more generally, to share beliefs and intentions). The evolutionary explanation Tomasello offers is that human ancestors were led through some kind of selection pressure to common foraging leading to collaboration and sharing. After outlining Tomasello's position as it is described in the book, as well as the comments by Dweck, Spelke, Silk and Skyrms which follow, I discuss Tomasello's thesis, noting a few problems with his approach. These are based on his own work and
Introduction
For the past twenty years or so, Michael Tomasello has developed a view of human uniqueness as directly linked to cultural development, in which he includes language. Thus, explaining human uniqueness becomes explaining what it is in human nature that explains human cultural development. In this respect, Tomasello's position lies with the dual inheritance (both phylogenetic and cultural) approach, advocated, notably, by Boyd and Richerson (2005; Richerson and Boyd 2006) . In keeping with that theoretical tradition, his approach to culture is based on the notion that what is both specifically human and explains human cultural explosion are human social skills. His present position is nevertheless original in that he goes farther than imitation, which has been the staple of dual inheritance approaches to human specificity.
Tomasello's position is derived from his own double expertise: he is a developmental psychologist (primarily interested in the development of communicative abilities, including language acquisition), as well as an experimental primatologist. His original candidate (see Tomasello 1999) for the specificity of human social cognition was imitation (in keeping with Boyd and Richerson's position), which he saw as grounded in simulation-based theory of mind (identification). Nevetheless, after having found some limited ability for theory of mind in chimpanzees, he has changed for what he dubs "shared intentionality" (see below). The theory is supported by a host of experiments, both on toddlers and on apes (mostly, but not only, chimpanzees). That more recent version of his theory has been pushed in papers (see, e.g., Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003; Moll and Tomasello 2007; Hermann et al. 2007; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; Tomasello et al. 2005) , and in two recent books, and both corresponding to prestigious lectures, the Jean Nicod lectures given in Paris in 2006 (see Tomasello 2008 ) and the Tanner lectures at Stanford in 2008. It is the latest one, published as Why we Cooperate, with which I will be concerned here.
Tomasello's theory is one among the many hypotheses linking human evolution to social life. These fall under two main strands, and Tomasello's "sharing" hypothesis, though compatible with both, is fairly original.
-The first strand, which I shall dub the "Social Brain Hypothesis", proposes that there is a direct link between the brain size of a species and the size of the group its members live in. Thus, Dunbar (1996 Dunbar ( , 2004 has proposed that the bigger the group size, the bigger the brain size. This hypothesis, though it has mainly been tested on primate species -and extrapolated on hominid fossils -is however not restricted to primates and could be extended to all vertebrate species. It has been taken to task in a meta-analysis (see Reader and Laland 2002) , who have shown that other factors, in addition to group size, are correlated to brain size, the main ones being tool use and innovation, thus reintroducing into the debate cognitive abilities not dedicated to sociability. -A second strand is the so-called Machiavellian Hypothesis, which has been put forward by Byrne and Whiten (see Byrne and Whiten 1988; Whiten and Byrne 1997) following Humphrey (1976) . Its basic tenet is that sophisticated cognitive abilities evolved in a classical evolutionary arm-race, due to the pressure of group living between cheaters and cheater detectors. This would lead to more and more sophisticated behaviour and, eventually, to mind-reading.
It should be clear that the Social Brain Hypothesis and the Machiavellian Hypothesis are mutually compatible. Tomasello's position is compatible with both, as long as one sees the Machiavellian Hypothesis as accounting for the cognitive evolution of nonhuman primates, including great apes. The originality here comes from the fact that Tomasello sees competition as the hallmark of nonhuman primate sociability, while human sociability is characterized by altruistic cooperation, based on sharing. Thus, human social cognition is radically different from nonhuman primate social cognition, and this introduces a major discontinuity between human and nonhuman primates. Why we cooperate includes not only Tomasello's text (roughly two thirds of the book, excluding notes), but also "Forum" comments by Silk, Dweck, Skyrms, and Spelke. I begin by outlining the contents of the book before discussing them in detail, drawing not only on Why we cooperate, as well as on Tomasello's previous books (see Tomasello 1999 Tomasello , 2008 as well as some of his most important recent papers (see, e.g., Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003; Moll and Tomasello 2007; Hermann et al. 2007; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; Tomasello et al. 2005) , but also confronting his theory with writings by other primatologists, developmentalists, and researchers on cultural transmission.
Contents
2.1 Why we cooperate, chapter by chapter Tomasello begins his Introduction by defining culture rather broadly, as social learning leading to "different ways of doing things" (ix) and notes that "humans … are the paradigmatic cultural species" (ibid.). Human culture is specific not only in having accumulated technology (cumulative artefacts) in a ratchet effect, but also in having promoted social institutions, i.e., "sets of behavioural practices governed by various kinds of mutually recognized norms and rules" (xi), from money to political systems through marriage. According to Tomasello these specificities of human culture rest on human-specific psychological processes, promoting sociability, which can be gathered under the blanket term of shared intentionality:
Shared intentionality involves, most basically, the ability to create with others joint intentions and joint commitments in cooperative endeavours. These joint intentions and commitments are structured by processes of joint attention and mutual knowledge, all underlain by the cooperative motives to help and share with others (xiii-xiv).
In other words, "to an unprecedent degree, homo sapiens are adapted for acting and thinking cooperatively in cultural groups" (xv). The whole set of cognitive abilities involved in shared intentionality rests on altruism, where one individual sacrifices its own interest for the benefit of another individual.
This leads to the first part of the book (Part I: Why we cooperate), which comprises three chapters in which Tomasello lays down his own view of why altruism is the core of human sociability and how it arose. Roughly, the first chapter concerns the ontogeny of human cooperation, the second chapter concerns its phylogeny and the third chapter is a short conclusion on the interaction between biology and culture in humans.
In the first chapter, Born (and bred) to help, concerned with the ontogeny of human sociability, Tomasello adopts a middle of the road position, which he dubs the Early Spelke, Later Dweck hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, helping others comes naturally to human children (around their first birthday), though it is reinforced by the cultural norms they later come to learn. This manifests itself in three departments, depending on whether the altruistic behaviour concerns goods (sharing), services (helpfulness) or information (informativeness). Helping is common to young children and chimpanzees, while both informativeness and sharing are more specifically human. These early natural tendencies of human children (Early Spelke) are later strengthened by reciprocity-enforcing social norms (Later Dweck). These social norms take two forms: norms of cooperation and norms of conformity. Children's sensitivity to social norms appears fairly early, and by 3 years of age, children will not only conform to social norms, but will also enforce them by punishing defectors. Tomasello sees this as a further indication that children have a social ("We-") rationality, manifested by their acceptance of arbitrary norms independent from specific individuals. The universality of social norms is obvious from the evolution of specific social emotions, such as guilt and shame. Thus, "children are altruistic by nature, and this is a predisposition that (because children are also naturally selfish) adults attempt to nurture" (47).
The second chapter, From social interaction to social institutions, deals with the phylogenetic side of human sociability, and here it is mutualism (collaboration) rather than altruism (cooperation) that takes pride of place. In mutualism everyone benefits, in contradistinction with altruism, and here Tomasello's model is the Stag Hunt (rather than the competitive Prisoner's Dilemma), leading him to a Silk for apes, Skyrms for humans hypothesis. The Stag Hunt model (see Skyrms 2004 ) is based on a remark by Rousseau in A discourse on Inequality, contrasting a necessarily collaborative hunt for a stag -because no single individual can hope to catch the stag by himself -with a possibly individual hunt for a hare. The fact that success on a stag hunt depends on collaboration entails sharing the benefits of the hunt, which obviously is not the case in an individual hunt, such as that for a hare. Basically, Tomasello's idea is that nonhuman primates' cooperation is based either on kinship or on direct reciprocity (Silk for apes), while in humans cooperation becomes collaboration, being based neither on benefiting (directly) one's own kin or (indirectly) oneself, because in humans all common endeavours are stag hunts (Skyrms for humans) . This human specificity rests on coordination, trust (notably in sharing food, e.g., the proceeds of the hunt), and social institutions, all of these reducing to shared (We-) intentionality. Here, Tomasello gives the example of two widely different human experiences: the supermarket and a shared walk between friends. What is unique in human collaborative activities is that they rest on a shared goal as well as on the coordination of the acts of the individuals participating in its pursuit. This is specific to humans, and such events as collective hunts for monkeys in Taï chimpanzees are only apparently collaborative in that the "apes are engaged in I-mode not in We-mode" (63). Tomasello sees the We-mode as emerging from ancestral cooperative foraging: "humans were put under some kind of selective pressure to collaborate in their gathering of food -they became obligate collaborators -in a way that their closest relatives were not" (75). This also explains the evolution of the size of human sclera, which is useful for the type of gaze detection necessary to establish shared attention. Tolerance for conspecifics, mainly defined as food sharing, is also specific to humans as chimpanzees share food only marginally. Tomasello then gets back to social norms and institutions, distinguishing again between (moral) norms of cooperation and (constitutive) norms of conformity. These two kinds of norms, resting on imitation and conformity, create "high degrees of intra-group homogeneity and inter-group heterogeneity" (94), allowing for cultural group selection. These norms turn games of competition (prisoner's dilemmas) into games of coordination (stag hunts) and create trust. This would not be sufficient to create the kind of conventional realities characteristic of social institutions (e.g., money) in the absence of abilities for symbolic communication, which themselves depend on cooperation in joint attentional activities.
Chapter 3, Where biology and culture meet, is a very short conclusion to the exposition of Tomasello's views. Recapitulating what was said in the two previous chapters, he concludes: "Human beings are biologically adapted to grow and develop to maturity within a cultural context. Through our collaborative efforts, we have built our cultural worlds, and we are constantly adapting to them" (107).
Part II, Forum, gathers comments by the main authors on whose work Tomasello rests his position: Silk, Dweck, Skyrms, and Spelke, in that order. Silk addresses Tomasello's phylogenetic story and begins by adding two characteristics to Tomasello's list of human specificities: "only humans can orchestrate cooperation in large groups of individuals with imperfectly aligned preferences" (113), and they care more for the welfare of others. But her main concern is with Tomasello's putting mutualism at the centre of human phylogeny and taking as his example the Stag Hunt. She notes that in the Stag Hunt the interests of the co-operators are perfectly aligned, in the sense that collaboration is the best choice for each individual as well as for the group, thus discouraging cheating. However, when, as is usual, individuals' and group's interests are not well aligned, cheaters will arise. Silk points out that mutualism in nature implies, more often than not, implies different species, the rare cases of conspecific mutualism arising in cooperatively breeding species. Conspecific cooperation usually does not correspond to mutualism, but to altruism, where the cost is balanced either by kin's advantage or by reciprocity. A further criticism is that "mutualism does not necessarily make you nice" (118). The concern that human beings take for the welfare of others thus does not necessarily stem from mutualism. Rather, the reverse might be true: altruism might have evolved in humans for a number of reasons, among which cooperative breeding, cultural group selection or indirect reciprocity, and mutualism arose from altruism.
Dweck argues against Tomasello's ontogenetic story (against an Early Spelke and for an Early and Later Dweck account), pointing out that the appearance of a behaviour at one year of age does not mean that it was there before and is independent of learning. She goes on to argue that the social contingencies of parent-child interactions from birth on contribute to the formation of the altruistic behaviours Tomasello describes as phylogenetically determined. Dweck outlines a wealth of experiments comparing children with secure to children with insecure attachments, showing that not only have children with insecure attachments different expectations than children with secure attachments, they also are less altruistic than them, seeming indifferent, if not outright hostile, to peers' distress. As Dweck points out: "At any rate, to argue for a strong form of Tomasello hypothesis, one would have to establish that there are no processes prior to one year of age in which children are sensitive to the practices, desires, and values of adults and try to act in accordance with them" (134).
Skyrms concentrates on human communication and discusses whether one should see it as based on common knowledge (implying infinite recursion) or on common ground (mutual belief, not implying infinite recursion). He advocates common ground as the basis for human communication, based on the fact that communication, in and of itself, does not necessitate common knowledge, as shown by animal communication. However, nor does it require pure common interest, as shown by the fact that communication, including animal communication, does not exclude deception. His hypothesis is that "if we move from common interests to mixed interests, we now typically can be led (by either evolution or learning) to an equilibrium in which the sender transmits some information and conceals some. Information transmission without pure common interest occurs naturally in many contexts" (145). Finally, though Skyrms does not develop that point further, he notes that, contrary to Tomasello's views, cooperation does not necessarily involve high-level cognitive abilities.
Spelke offers the last comment on Tomasello's views, hitting on what she thinks may be an alternative explanation for the cultural explosion which Tomasello sees as the heart of human uniqueness, that is human language. Spelke then goes on to outline the systems of core knowledge which have been evidenced in infants (before 1 year of age): systems for representing and reasoning about inanimate objects, intentional agents, space, and social partners. Humans share at least some of these with other animals, but other cognitive systems, specific to humans, such as complex tool use, natural numbers and geometry, seem to depend on combinatorial abilities, bypassing modular frontiers, linked to human language. Thus, just like the other commentators of Tomasello, Spelke proposes to upset Tomasello's causality: rather than human language stemming from human social abilities, human social abilities might come from human language: "Distinctively human forms of communication and cooperation may depend on uniquely human combinatorial capacities" (170).
Summary of Why we cooperate
Summing up, culture (social learning leading to "different ways of doing things") has taken an extraordinary dimension in the human species, due to some human psychological specificities, i.e., shared intentionality. Shared intentionality is both the cause and the result of a dual inheritance process, in which humans are phylogenetically determined to altruism and this tendency is reinforced by the very cultural norms and institutions that it allows (Early Spelke, later Dweck). This phylogenetic altruism contrasts with the limited cooperation found in nonhuman primates, which is either kin-based or reciprocal. Human altruism comes from mutualism which developed from ancestral common foraging, hypothetically arising from selective pressure (Silk for apes, Skyrms for humans) . In other words, Tomasello's theory can be summed up in the following causal schema: All of Tomasello's commentators question this causal model. Silk and Dweck attack the link between mutualism and altruism; Skyrms and Spelke, the link between altruism and cultural norms and institutions, including language. Silk disputes that the Stag Hunt is the correct model for all human interactions, either in the past or now, and proposes that mutualism comes from altruism rather than the reverse. All three other critics concentrate on whether cooperation (in the human altruistic sense) really is phylogenetically rather than ontogenetically determined, whether cooperation really is altruistic and does imply high-level cognitive processes, or whether the causality really does go from sophisticated nonverbal cognitive social processes to language, or rather in the reverse direction, sophistication stemming from language-based combinatorial abilities. Thus these criticisms go to the heart of Tomasello's theory, though the commentators rightly extol Tomasello's important contribution to the now trendy current of thought which places sociability at the heart of "humaniqueness", to borrow Hauser's (2009) term. It is a pity that Tomasello was not given an opportunity to answer these criticisms, given that they may spawn further criticisms of Tomasello's views, as we shall now see.
Taking the criticism farther
I begin with two points that may seem to be relatively minor, given where the emphasis lies in the present book, before turning to deeper problems which seem to arise from Tomasello's view, more or less in keeping with the issues raised by the commentators in the book.
Can a dual-inheritance account rest on purely social abilities?
Dual-inheritance accounts of humaniqueness seem to have won the day. However, most of them being based -as is Tomasello's account -on purely social skills (imitation in Boyd and Richerson's account, shared intentionality in Tomasello's case), they meet with difficulties in accounting for the cultural explosion in humans. These difficulties concern two aspects of culture, though the second aspect is obviously less affected than the first. It is standard to distinguish between invention (the possibly individual discovery or creation or a new artefact, way of doing things, idea, etc.,) and innovation (the artifactual realisation and/or spread of an invention; see Fagerberg 2005) . Innovation may seem fairly amenable to a social account (though see Sperber and Claidière 2008) , being mainly concerned with spreading the invention, but it is far from clear that this is the fact for invention where it seems that non-social cognition (e.g., reasoning, problem solving, etc.,) has to be involved. In other words, social skills (and the cognitively social abilities they rest on) may be the main part of the story behind spreading a given content, but the content itself cannot be reduced to or explained by such social skills, as long as their basis is social cognition. On the other hand, if social skills did not depend on social cognition, but on some kind of non-social cognition, the account would not be purely social. In other words, purely social versions of dual inheritance accounts face the problem of the generation of content. This problem, as we shall see below, is a major difficulty for Tomasello's account as a whole.
A more general worry, again not specific to Tomasello's account, is that the cumulative artefacts, at least since the industrial revolution, may have spread through social skills, but their conception and modification rest less and less on the kind of apprenticeship for which those skills would be important and more and more on fairly impersonal cognitive skills, which would somewhat change the picture of the human cultural explosion (see Gellner's (1983 Gellner's ( /2006 ) distinction between intimate transmission of skills and exo-education).
Doesn't Tomasello exaggerate the social discontinuities among primates?
Tomasello sees primate species as discontinuous, with monkeys and great apes on one side as primarily competitive species, while humans on the other side would be the one and only cooperative species. One can wonder whether this does not exaggerate the differences. A first point is that other primatologists do not agree with the notion of nonhuman primates as uniformly competitive and, notably, de Waal (2005 Waal ( , 2006 Waal ( , 2009 ) has been at pain to point out many instances (both anecdotal and experimental) of altruism between nonkin primates, from monkeys to great apes. Indeed, de Waal points out that an evolutionary account of human morality might be based on such observations. In the same way, Boesch (2009) has documented many instances of systematic altruistic behaviours in wild chimpanzees in the Taï forest: these range from help in fights against chimpanzees from neighbouring groups to help against predators (leopards) as well as cooperation in collective hunts of monkeys (more about this below). The fact that these altruistic behaviours are, again, not restricted to kin, gives them an added weight as counter-examples to the competition which Tomasello sees as outlining all nonhuman primate interactions. This is especially true if one takes into account the fact that nonhuman primates apparently are not given to reciprocity (see Jensen et al. 2007; Hauser et al. 2009 ), leaving open the possibility that their altruistic behaviour toward nonkin conspecifics is not governed by any kind of self-interest, which would make it rather similar to what Tomasello claims human behaviour to be. In other words, painting nonhuman primates as competitive may be a simplifying assumption, which, by the way, flies in the face of what was demonstrated by Tomasello himself, i.e., that chimpanzees will give help in much the same way as do young children (see Tomasello 2006, 2009 ). They may not inform or share food as readily as young children do, but the fact that they give help at all does seem to weaken a uniformly competitive description of their behaviour.
On the other hand, one might wonder whether Tomasello does not paint to rosy a picture of human interactions. This was rather more obvious in Tomasello's previous book (see Tomasello 2008) , where the description of the human species was almost hagiographic. Given historical reality, this is a rather dubious picture, which has been somewhat toned down in the present book. However, Tomasello still claims that human interactions in general resort to (collaborative) Stag Hunts rather than to (competitive) Prisoners' Dilemma. On this point, Why we cooperate seems to entirely ignore the dominance factor in human relations, insisting on an egalitarianism which may be characteristic of human hunter-gatherer societies, but which seems far from the reality of human societies at least since the agrarian revolution of more than ten thousand years ago. A fair sharing of the proceeds does not seem more on the cards in developed democracies than it is in chimpanzee societies, appearances notwithstanding (see Bartels 2008) .
How did "sharing" evolve?
Leaving aside the question of whether the social discontinuity between humans and chimpanzees is as deep as Tomasello claims, let us turn to his evolutionary account for the supposedly specific altruism of humans. He claims that altruism had its roots in mutualism. Setting aside Silk's doubts about the direction of causality, this implies, under Tomasello's present account, which remains rather sketchy on that point, that it is common foraging (rather than, for instance, common hunting) which created the mutualistic circumstance in which shared intentionality initially evolved. A problem with this account is that (as noted by Silk) in the Stag Hunt, the interests of the participants are aligned and collaboration is the best choice, both at individual and at group level. Tomasello hints at a selective pressure for common foraging, but it is not clear what such a pressure would be. A possibility would be that common foraging would give protection from predation. But, apart from the fact that this is usually the reason for group living in the first place -and thus presumably applies to social species of mammals in general, and not specifically to humans -the very idea of the Stag Hunt model lies in the fact that no individual could catch the stag by himself. How this could be the case in foraging is mysterious, unless one includes hunting in foraging and more specifically hunting difficult to catch animals. Presumably, foraging for berries, roots, etc., (gathering), though it may be done in group for protection, does not depend for its results on being done collectively (indeed, rather the reverse: the more people there are to pick berries, the less berries there is for each of them). Thus, it seems that if one accepts, pace Silk, that human altruism stems from mutualism, collaborative hunting would fit the picture much better than common foraging. It is in fact difficult to see why Tomasello does not assume that collaborative hunting is the answer to the problem, apart from the fact that, given the well-documented existence of collaborative hunting in Taï chimpanzees (see Boesch 1994a Boesch , 1994b Boesch , 2002 Boesch , 2009 Boesch and Boesch 1989) , Tomasello wants to reinforce the discontinuity between human and nonhuman primates.
In the past Tomasello has presented the following objections to taking seriously the collective hunting of Taï chimpanzees: -collective hunting is described from field observations, rather than from experimental tests (Tomasello et al. 2005) ; -collective hunting is not truly collaborative, chimpanzees do not willingly share the proceeds (Tomasello 2008 (Tomasello , 2009 ); -collective hunting is not truly collaborative, it does not imply shared intentionality (Tomasello 2008 (Tomasello , 2009 ).
None of these objections, however, seems decisive in itself. Regarding the first one, collaborative hunting in Taï chimpanzees has not been the object of a single and possibly mistaken observation: rather Boesch and his colleagues have been studying collaborative hunting in Taï chimpanzees for the past twenty years (see, e.g., Boesch and Boesch 1989; Boesch 1994a Boesch , 1994b Boesch , 2002 Boesch , 2009 ) and have documented and analysed all the minutiae of the hunt, as well as the meat sharing between male participants and on-looking females, and indicate that the portion of meat given to the different participants is tailored to the different roles they have played in the hunt (sharing with on-looking females, though not with on-looking males, presumably is an orthogonal issue). Regarding the second one, as just said, meat sharing is well documented in Taï chimpanzees. And Tomasello rests his case against a cooperative account of such hunts in Taï chimpanzees on field observations (which, in this case, he is ready to accept) of meat sharing among Gombe chimpanzees (see Gilby 2006) . However, as Boesch and his team have shown, Gombe chimpanzees hunt collectively much more seldom and collective hunting when it occurs among them is widely different from collective hunting in Taï chimpanzees in that it is collaborative. In other words, it is not clear why one should consider meat sharing in Gombe chimpanzees as relevant to a discussion of collaborative hunting in Taï chimpanzees. I will address the third objection in the next section, as it crucially depends on the definition of "shared intentionality". To conclude the discussion of collaborative hunting in Taï chimpanzees, Boesch has argued, conclusively I think, that the differences between Gombe chimpanzees, who seldom hunt collectively and do not cooperate when they do, and Taï chimpanzees who mainly hunt collectively and cooperate when they do, come from two different environmental factors: (1) Taï chimpanzees are subject to a strong predation pressure by leopards, while Gombe chimpanzees are free from predators; (2) given that Taï chimpanzees live in a rain forest, where the Colobus monkeys can pass from tree to tree through the canopy, the only chance to catch one is to hunt collaboratively, to prevent the target monkey from escaping; this is not the case for Gombe chimpanzees who live in a savannah with isolated trees. In other words, the collaborative hunt of the Taï chimpanzees seems to answer perfectly to the description of the Stag Hunt: a single chimpanzee has little chance to catch a monkey by himself, while a collective hunt will be in the interests of the group of participants as well as of each individual participant. Incidentally, Taï chimpanzees are also, according to Boesch's (2009) careful comparison, more altruistic than Gombe chimpanzees, coming to the rescue when a group member is attacked either by a chimpanzee from another group or by a leopard, as well as caring for wounded group members. This says nothing about the direction of causality, or even about the existence of a causal link: it may be that both mutualism in hunting and altruistic behaviours have a common origin in predation pressure, or equally mutualism may have caused altruism or altruism (possibly originating in predator pressure) may have triggered mutualism.
In any case, the existence of even moderately altruistic and mutualistic behaviours in some chimpanzee populations rather weakens Tomasello's evolutionary story.
What is "shared intentionality"?
A major issue regarding Tomasello's account of humaniqueness is with the very definition of "shared intentionality". Let us begin with the notion of "sharing". It was given centre of place in the BBS collective paper (see Tomasello et al. 2005) , as well as in the 2008 book and in a number of papers (see, e.g., Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003; Moll and Tomasello 2007; Herrmann et al. 2007; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007) , where it was supposed to involve common knowledge in the strongly recursive sense, that is, as involving infinite recursion. It was clear that Tomasello (2008) did harbour some serious misgivings about it, as he suggested that the infinite recursion might be "dispositional" rather than effective, and, in the final chapter, that "in explaining how contemporary humans operate in real time, it is possible that no notion of recursivity is actually operative, but rather humans simply possess a primitive notion of we-intentionality. Indeed, I think that this is exactly what young infants do" (Tomasello 2008: 336) . The problem with these two suggestions is that it is hard to see what it would mean for infinite recursion to be dispositional and even harder to see how we-intentionality, if it is described in terms of infinite recursion, could be "a primitive notion". It seems, from what he says a few lines below, that Tomasello intended this to mean that humans, including young children, can recognize situations in which we-intentionality is present, from situations in which it is absent. This much is certainly true, but it seems to make shared or we-intentionality a substantially less sophisticated notion than was initially assumed (see, e.g., Tomasello et al. 2005 ). Skyrms assumes that in the present book, Tomasello has abandoned this notion in favour of mutual belief which is much weaker than common knowledge, in that, being belief, it need not be true and that it "only goes up one level in the hierarchy of shared beliefs" (142). There is no doubt that this is an improvement on the theory, given the implausibility of humans (to say nothing of young children) being able of infinite recursion. However, it may put sharing within range of nonhuman primates, e.g., chimpanzees. If this is the case, the last objection to the Taï chimpanzees' collective hunt being cooperative seems to fall down. Leaving this aside for the moment, let us know turn to the notion of "intentionality".
As noted above, the difficulty here may be more or less common to all social approaches and it has to do with content. Intentionality in the philosophical sense in which it is intended by Tomasello presupposes content of some sort, but, on Tomasello's account, there does not seem to be anything to account for content and for the extent and sophistication of the content that humans can have intentions (in the philosophical sense) about. This is much the same problem as was discussed above regarding invention as opposed to innovation (see § 4.1). The problem seems to be widespread in social accounts in as much as they rely on transitive notions such as sharing, communicating, spreading, etc., without seemingly taking into account the missing ingredient, i.e., content. Whatever we are sharing, communicating about, spreading, etc., has to exist before it can be shared, communicated, spread, etc. We are given no explanation of how it originated (presumably not in social cognition in and of itself) nor about the cognitive mechanisms which make it possible to grasp or represent and which, presumably, are central in both the production and the interpretation of utterances (in the wide, not necessarily verbal, Gricean sense). This gives a strong impression that somehow and rather miraculously content arises from non-content. (Note that this objection is germane to Spelke's comment.)
A possible answer to this objection (which, as said above, is an objection to all purely social accounts) was given by Dunbar (1996) who analyzed everyday conversations in pubs and evaluated the amount of social information transmitted in such conversation to be about 70% of all communicated information. What he understood by social information seems to have been gossip, personal stories, stories about the private lives of celebrities, and so on. Quite apart from the fact that one could query whether these are social information in the sense that they would not need any sort of non-social cognitive abilities, it still remains that 30% of pub conversations do not deal with such social issues (and this non-social content has to be accounted for) and that presumably not all conversations run on the lines of pub conversations.
Another answer, more in keeping with Tomasello's central interest in pointing in young children, is that the content is available through shared attention. The type of pointing relevant here is not so-called proto-imperative pointing (which acculturated apes and autistic children do and in which the pointer wants the addressee to give him the target), but so-called proto-declarative pointing in which, according to Tomasello, the pointer wants to share her attention to a given object with an addressee, with a view to manipulate not the addressee's action (as in proto-imperatives) but to manipulate the addressee's state of mind (via his or her attentional state). In such cases of proto-declarative pointings, it seems clear that the content is accessible either directly in the environment, or from association with an element of the environment (in his 2008 book, Tomasello makes much of the fact that some children point to communicate about an absent object or event through its habitual location or through an object or location it is associated with). This "sharing" account of proto-declarative pointing has been questioned by Southgate et al. (2007) who interpret it as interrogative, i.e., as asking information about the object from the adult addressee.
A telling comment was made on a 2005 paper by Brownell et al. (2005) , who pointed out that young children's relations with peers are highly different from children's relations with adults and that "collaborative understanding or motivation to collaborate with peers [does not appear] until the close of the second year of life or well into the third year of life" (Brownell et al. 2005: 693) . This is readily understandable under Southgate et al. 's suggestion, given that adults are more competent than peers and hence more likely to be knowledgeable, but it is not on Tomasello's sharing account: if human children are dedicated to sharing, why should their interactions with peers differ from their interactions with adults? This suggests that not only do children more readily communicate with adults, they might also rely on adult expertise in their collaborative interactions.
A recent paper by Csibra (2010) seems relevant here. Csibra describes three infant-directed adult behaviours -direct gaze generating eye contact, motherese, and contingent reactivity to infant's behaviour -which he describes in terms of the distinction proposed by Wilson (1986/1995) between communicative and informative intentions: "The communicator's informative intention is to achieve a certain effect in the addressee by modifying her cognitive environment, while his communicative intention is to make his informative intention manifest for the addressee (or mutually manifest between the communicator and the addressee)" (Csibra 2010: 141) . As Csibra points out, the two intentions can come apart: for instance, one can recognize an informative intention without recognizing any communicative intention (presumably this may be what happens in some cases of animal communication as well, see Reboul 2007) and vice versa (for instance, when someone speaks to you in a foreign language, you recognize that she has a communicative intention without being able to identify her informative intention). This separability means that some signals, called ostensive signals, could be specialized to encode the existence of a communicative intention (independently of any specific informative intention). Csibra's hypothesis is that some infant-directed adult behaviours are such coded ostensive signals.
From that point of view, "recognizing communicative intentions (in the sense of noticing their presence rather accessing their content) is not the outcome but one of the sources of the development of communicative skills" (Csibra 2010: 144) and is dependent on adult behaviour, in keeping with the remarks above. It should also be noted that the third kind of infant-directed behaviour listed by Csibra, i.e., contingent reactivity to infant's behaviour, echoes Dweck's comment to the effect that secure attachment, based on adult contingent reactivity, is the source of altruism in children.
Clearly, detecting a communicative intention does not solve the problem of content, but it suggests a way of developing the "shared" intentionality proposed by Tomasello, based on those coded ostensive signals, that, according to Csibra, trigger inferential processes aimed at identifying the informative intention. Again this suggests that infant-adult communication and cooperation depends on adult scaffolding, and that shared intentionality is built on the "natural pedagogy" (see Csibra and Gergely 2009) provided by the very early interactions that coded ostensive signals make possible. In other words, sharing does not precede and explain pedagogy (leading to culture), rather pedagogy precedes and explains sharing. This suggests that Dweck's comment is rather well-grounded and extends it beyond child altruism to child communication.
Conclusion
Why we cooperate is an extremely interesting and readable book, which not only synthetically presents Tomasello's current position on the evolution of human specificities, that is a dual-inheritance account with an interesting and original twist, but also includes well taken criticisms of his position. I have tried to add to the discussion. It should be clear that, though no one could deny the unique status of the human species in terms of cognitive and technological achievements, that status is nevertheless rather difficult to account for in evolutionary terms. Tomasello attempts to explain it through human-specific socio-cultural abilities, and, though one can question aspects of his theory, it is an extremely valuable contribution to the debate, based as it is on a widespread experimental approach both to child development and to primatology. Indeed, the main reproach that one could address to Tomasello's account is that it tends to simplify what has to be a complex story and to ignore some relevant facts, including facts that he himself has brought to light in his experimental work.
To my mind, the most fundamental problem with his approach is one that it shares with all "social" accounts of human cognition, that is the problem of content. As said above, Dunbar's account of the progression of brain volume is onesided in that a direct link between brain size and group size leaves aside the correlations between brain size and tool use or innovation noted by Reader and Laland (2002) , and Boyd and Richerson's account of culture suffers also from concentrating on innovation, rather than invention. It may be time for some "integrated" approach, taking into account both social and non-social cognitive abilities in human development.
Finally, the main lack in Why we cooperate is an answer by Tomasello to his commentators. It is a pity and one can only hope that Tomasello will have other occasions to discuss his work in print and answer those as well as other possible criticisms of his position.
1. "The animal kingdom then develops, its species increase and in the gradual progress of Creation, it ends up in man -gifted with thought and intelligence. The human plan is reached from the monkeys, where sagacity and perception can be found, but who have not yet reached the stage of intelligence and thought. From this point of view, the first human level comes after the monkey world" (Ibn Khaldûn, Discours sur l'Histoire universelle: Al-Muqaddima, translated by V. Monteil, page 147, my translation from the French).
